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Abstract 
This is a paper proposing a general theory of ideology based on two theoretical 
components, liberty and change. Liberty is seen as a system for understanding the 
individual and its relation to the group, change is seen as a system for 
understanding our future prospects. I propose that these two components can be 
used to coherently describe ideology over time and space. I describe the various 
perspectives on liberty and time that are needed to do this. I also conduct a small 
q-study to test whether there is any indication that this approach holds weight. The 
results indicate that this conception of a general theory of ideology is plausible. 
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1 Introduction 
I propose describing ideology through a two component model, the reason for this 
is to try and understand ideology beyond the practicalities of a particular political 
moment. By observing, what I contend are, the two basic streams of logic within 
an ideology, we might be able to establish taxonomies of ideology that transcend 
the practicalities of various spatio-temporal incarnations, and show where and 
why major shifts or schisms occur.  
 
The two components that I hypothesize can be used to describe ideology are time 
and liberty. More specifically, time as the individual's perspective on change, is it 
rational-prognostic or prophetic (Koselleck, 2004), and liberty as in the 
individual’s understanding of the relationship between individual and group. 
Furthermore liberty is described beyond the usual negative-positive dichotomy. 
The Republican, or Neo-roman conception of liberty is included to give liberty a 
broader explanatory range. 
 
1.1 Why is this a good idea? 
In a sense this paper should be understood as proposing a general theory of 
ideology based on the idea that there are fundamental political drivers, namely the 
perspective on the individual and its relation to the group, and the individual’s 
perspective on change. There is of course massive complexity within these 
perspectives, however I think complexity in itself is not an issue as long as the 
complexity is contained within a coherent framework. The simplicity of my 
proposed model allows for analytically structured comparison over time and 
space. It alters our perspective on ideology from a series of disconnected schools 
of thought, to instead being various iterations of various combinations of a finite 
number of factors. This allows us to coherently analyse ideological trends 
historically, and understand present ideological trends without creating overly 
complex (specific) analytical tools that fail to operate coherently over time and 
space. 
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2 Methodology 
2.1 Aim and Question 
As a first step in studying this model I intend to present the foundational 
assumptions made about liberty and change. I will then conduct a small q-study to 
see if there is any credence to the notion that perspectives on time and liberty 
pattern individual thought in relation to ideology. If there is that supports further 
study, if not it would invalidate the basic structure of the model, thereby rendering 
it uninteresting. 
 
2.2 Hypothesis 
My hypothesis for this paper is that we will be able to observe patterning of 
thought based on liberty and time. More specifically we will be able to observe 
patterns of thought based on negative liberty, positive liberty and republican 
liberty, furthermore we will be able to observe how these patterns interact with 
patterning of thought based on a rational-prognostic perspective on change and a 
prophetic perspective on change. Furthermore these patterns of time and liberty 
should correspond to the current spatio-temporal pattern of ideology that these 
actors exist within. The null-hypothesis for this paper would be no structured 
patterning of thought along the lines of liberty and time that I propose. 
 
2.3 Ideology 
Why are liberty and time useful constructs for understanding ideology? To answer 
this question we must first clarify the concept of ideology. The term ideology has 
a long and varied history, emanating from the period of the French revolution. 
The word ideology came into life through the idea of studying ideas as “universal 
and nomothetic categories (Stråth, 2013: 3).” From this point forward the term has 
racketed about political discourse, mainly inhabiting the space of denigrating 
political opponents for being “ideological”, i.e. in some way divested from the 
political realities, and in some way deceiving the public with partisan politics. 
This has taken the shape of; Marxist critique of the role bourgeoisie ideology 
plays in legitimating oppression, or Napoleon's critique of ideologues as a label 
for “unrealistic theories that tried to intervene in the spheres of government and 
political action (Stråth, 2013: 5).” The Marxist usage might be seen as 
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revolutionary, and the Napoleonic as conservative, either way ideology has 
traditionally had a pejorative connotation, where objectivity stood in contrast to 
ideology.  
 
According to Peter Breinner (2013), Karl Mannheim, in his book Ideology and 
Utopia, was one of the first theorists who showed the relative nature of political 
knowledge. He did this by pointing out the phenomenological truth of personal 
myths and rituals that serve to shape ideology. This enabled the removal of the 
pejorative connotation attached to ideology and acknowledged the theoretical 
poverty inherent to studying ideologies objectively, as one would merely be 
engaged in judging one subjective myth/fact complex using another. Breinner 
(2013: 39) writes of Mannheim's perspective that, “A synoptic understanding of 
the political field must come from a point within it.” This relativized, value-free, 
understanding of ideology is echoed in the functionalist account that emerged 
after the second world war (Stråth, 2013), the functionalist perspective sees 
ideology as a framework for structuring individual value preferences, ideology is 
thereby seen as contingent on actors values. 
 
Continuing in this relativized understanding of ideology, the linguistic turn “made 
it possible to view ideologies as an interpretive framework constituted by 
semantic fields and key concepts” (Stråth, 2013: 15).  This perspective perceives 
ideology in the contestation of “key political concepts and the occupation of 
semantic fields” (Ibid: 15). In this sense language as a concept of ideology 
collapses Mannheim’s myth/ritual social construct and the individual values of the 
functionalist concept into a discursive context, the discursive context being a field 
“always containing multiple and contested meanings” (Ibid: 15). However the 
sources of meaning might be less definite, and there is a larger focus on 
hegemonic discourse in this understanding of ideology. Liberty for instance, is 
understood as a relative concept in all three previously mentioned relative 
understandings of ideology, however, whereas Mannheim and the functional 
account focus on understanding the subjective reality of its origins; the linguistic 
perspective might be seen as having a more critical focus on how actors establish 
and maintain hegemonic control over the concept in the discursive context. 
 
I find myself firmly in the relativistic camp of ideology, perhaps trending more 
towards the functional account in this particular paper. However I think all 
relativistic accounts can be useful in understanding the various perspectives of 
ideology. The functional account can perhaps be seen as carrying within it both 
Mannheim’s perspective, and the linguistic perspective on ideology, expanding as 
one allows the functional perspective to become increasingly complex as more 
functionality is included as one allows for greater complexity of the subject and 
the relational nature between subject and ideology. This perspective is perhaps 
captured in one of Stråth’s (Ibid) summarizing statements on ideology: 
 
The term is seen simultaneously as an instrument that provides orientation and 
initiates political action and as an instrument to control the world manipulated 
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by the powers that be or want to be. However, as Freeden has put it, not every 
ideology is dropped from a great height on an unwilling society. Ideologies are 
also everyday phenomena which we produce, disseminate, and consume 
throughout our lives (pp. 17) 
 
So when it comes to ideology we stand on a morass of moving parts and relativity. 
But, I think we can all agree that no matter the causal chain, be it factors of 
production, the linguistic context, genetics, individual values, myth, ritual, 
whimsy; that the individual is a fixed point for us to rest on. If ideology is based 
on myth, language or values, these all emanate and actualize themselves through 
the individual, even with the most pessimistic view of individual will, the 
individual remains the conduit. Even if we allow for the incarnation of ideology 
outside of the individual, in text, architecture, geography, planning, all this is still 
interpreted by the individual. Of course someone might still talk of false 
consciousness, and when they prove anything we will be in for trouble. But until 
then I think that we should be able to study the individual and it doesn’t really 
matter how the individual came to think what it does.  
 
Now, we must of course still be very aware of the power differences in 
individuals. Brown (1980) talks of a case where there was one individual with a 
completely different perspective from all others measured. In a typical study he 
might have been hidden in the mean, but as it turned out this individual was the 
manager of the group; because of his power, his point of view was immensely 
important for understanding that particular case. What certain individuals think is 
quite probably more important than what other individuals think. 
 
To summarize, ideology as a term in itself is relative, ideologies are subjective, 
and the individual has subjective perspectives that interact with ideology shaping 
and being shaped, but as long as we're only describing individual perspectives on 
ideology, we might be safe from the tricky relativity of the term itself by focusing 
squarely on what the individual thinks and not bothering with wondering why. 
Furthermore I think any attempt to understand why an individual would think in a 
particular way would be greatly improved by having a subjectively produced map 
of the individual’s thoughts to begin with. 
 
2.4 Studying subjectivity 
I propose to study ideology from the standpoint that each ideology represents a 
coherent phenomenologically true collective consciousness, to study this we must 
observe the subjectivities that produce the consciousness to avoid imposing an 
external frame of reference.  
 
Within political science we’ve studied phenomena extensively, but perhaps we 
lack understanding of the subject that wills phenomena into being. Could it be the 
case that by focusing on the phenomenon, ideology, instead of studying the 
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patterning of subjectivities we are missing something about the nature of 
ideology? I say this because one might contend that the constant here is not the 
produced phenomena (ideology), but rather the individual, subjective, frames of 
reality that produce it, and that the particular spatio-temporal incarnation of 
ideology is merely constant, subjective, frames of reality interacting with practical 
context. So one might conceptualize an idea of ideology that could be studied by 
analysing the subjectivities that produce the phenomena. Perhaps it’s the case that 
we are dealing with a set of relatively constant “meta-ideologies” oriented around 
subjective perspectives that produce spatio-temporal variance in ideology as they 
interact with the particularities of context. 
 
The question one needs to ask then is, is subjectivity random, or patterned? This 
claim has been extensively tested by Steven R. Brown (1980) using Q-
methodology, with the conclusion that subjectivity is patterned and it can be a 
fruitful area of empirical study. 
 
With this in mind, the first step in testing a model of a subjective perspective on 
ideology, is testing the validity of the claim that subjective understandings of 
liberty and time are patterned according to the two component model of ideology 
that I propose and that the patterning corresponds to current ideological 
patterning. This can be done by querying individuals, on their subjective 
understandings of liberty and time. If they pattern according to the model then this 
would indicate that it might be well worth to continue with this theoretical 
understanding of ideology. 
 
The way this could be done is with Q-method, Q-method is a methodology for 
objectively studying subjectivities by having them rank statements and then factor 
analysing the statements to reveal patterns of thought. By ranking statements they 
are transformed from disparate statements into numbers that can be analysed 
mathematically. This is done through a four step process, described by Steven R 
Brown (1980) in his book Operant Subjectivity. First you study the concourse or 
communicative field of the field of interest, in this case liberty and time. Then you 
produce a Q-sample, these are statements that represent the various point of 
interest within the concourse, these statements are then sorted in a Q-sort, by the 
actors. The sorted Q-samples are then factor analysed to see if the subjective 
patterns of thought are structured among the actors. Hopefully there will emerge 
points of convergence between individual subjectivities, this would illustrate 
regularities of subjectivity that we can then try to understand and describe. 
 
The advantages of using q-method in studying contested concepts such as liberty 
and time are clear. They allow us to map out the various positions held by 
political actors from their own perspective. This is vital, as the nature of contested 
concepts, and ideological terms more broadly, is that they contain biases. So in 
studying these contested concepts we should proceed from the inside out so to 
speak, using the subjective view of the actor as our starting point and then 
mapping the data that the actor produces when it interacts with the range of 
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statements that pertain to the phenomena. In this way theory points out what we 
should ask the actor, but it does not structure the actor’s response, this is done by 
the actor. 
 
I see this as an inductive method of studying subjectivities, it allows us to actually 
see who thinks what and then proceed from there in mapping these individuals. 
Instead of guessing who thinks what and then measuring the variance accordingly, 
with individuals who map outside the presupposed variance being seen as errors 
instead of pointing out the problems of the theory. Brown (1980) writes of typical 
studies of public attitudes that: 
 
They are to logicocategorical because, lacking operant categories, they employ 
arbitrary social categories (Polish, Catholic, low income, etc.) without 
considering whether or not these categories are functional in any individual 
case. Consequently, they end up describing relationships among their own 
mental constructs rather than the reality upon which the constructs are 
superimposed, i.e., we are left knowing little about the actual phenomena of 
public- or private-regardingness, but a good deal about a variety of attitudes and 
variables with which they are said to be correlated. (pp. 28) 
 
The aim is to discern functional categories, based on the subjective thought 
patterns of individuals. What I intend to do is to test if change and liberty might 
be functional categories in relation to ideology. 
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3 Liberty and Change 
3.1 Liberty 
I contend that liberty as a concept fundamentally relates to the conceptualization 
of the logos and its relation to nature. Furthermore liberty as a concept establishes 
some means of attaining liberty within the conceptualization of the logos and its 
relation to nature. I’m inspired to this understanding of liberty by Hannah 
Arendt’s (2013) discussions on how the polis constitutes the space for the 
articulation of the logos in Greek thought. Set in contrast to the Lockean (n.d.) 
conception of the reasoning man in the state of nature entering into a political 
society “to supply those defects and imperfections which are in us, as living single 
and solely by ourselves, we are naturally induced to seek communion and 
fellowship with others (Locke n.d.: 206).”  
 
Whereas Arendt (2013) presupposes the articulation of the logos as being 
predicated on the existence of the ordered polis, distinguishing men outside the 
polis as barbarians who by the nature of their living in a pre-political state of 
violence are mute in relation to their logos. Locke (n.d.) presupposes that the 
logos indeed can articulate itself in the face of the violence in the pre-political 
state of nature and that the entering into society is done to succour some other 
need than the need for articulation of the logos. The succinct point being not in the 
question of reason in pre-political societies or state of nature but in the question, is 
the political group an artificial construction or is the articulation of the logos 
contingent on the political group and therefore, is the political an essential aspect 
of being human. We find different thoughts in Aristotle: 
 
It is clear therefore that the state is also prior by nature to the individual; for if 
each individual when separate is not self-sufficient, he must be related to the 
whole state as other parts are to their whole, while a man who is incapable of 
entering into partnership, or who is so self-sufficing that he has no need to do so, 
is no part of a state, so that he must be either a lower animal or a god.” 
(Aristotle, 1932) 
 
And Locke: 
 
The only way whereby any one divests himself of his natural liberty, and puts on 
the bonds of civil society, is by agreeing with other men to join and unite into a 
community, for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst 
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another, in a secure enjoyment of their properties, and a greater security against 
any, that are not of it. (Locke n.d.: 279) 
 
These contrasting perspectives on the logos and its relation to the polis inform my 
reading of three seminal texts on liberty. I will proceed first in discussing negative 
and republican liberty as they proceed from the logos as a constant, with positive 
liberty presenting a radical departure from this with its raising the spectre of false 
consciousness thereby relativizing the logos. The texts are Isaiah Berlin’s (2006) 
Two Concepts of Liberty, Charles Taylor’s (2006) What’s wrong with Negative 
Liberty? And Quentin Skinner’s (2006) A third concept of Liberty. 
 
3.2 Negative Liberty 
I will start this discussion of negative liberty with two quotes from Two Concepts 
of Liberty, in this text, Berlin (2006) writes, “Political liberty in this sense is 
simply the area within which a man can act unobstructed by others.” (pp. 369). 
And: “The criterion of oppression is the part that I believe to be played by other 
human beings, directly or indirectly, with or without the intention of doing so, in 
frustrating my wishes. By being free in this sense I mean not being interfered with 
by others. The wider the area of non-interference the wider my freedom (Ibid, 
2006: 370).”  
 
What Berlin is affirming in these two quotes is the Hobbesian position that liberty 
should be understood as non-interference. In this understanding the Individual is 
at liberty in relation to the amount of interference it experiences when it acts. The 
interesting aspect of this perspective on liberty, as described by Locke (n.d.) in 
The Second Treatise of Government. Is that the state of nature is seen as being the 
state in which the logos is most free, by entering into civil society the logos 
divests itself of liberty for some other good. 
 
This fundamental pre-political view of the logos is illustrated in figure 1, where 
we see Logos (L), enjoying liberty in an unobstructed state. This rather simplistic 
view of liberty is then complicated by the contractarian notion that “this kind of 
‘natural’ freedom would lead to social chaos in which men’s minimum need 
would not be satisfied; or else the liberties of the weak would be suppressed by 
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the strong” (Berlin, 2006: 370). This leads to the establishment of some polis, but 
as Berlin goes on to point out, the sacrifice made by the logos in entering into this 
polis is a sacrifice of the liberty enjoyed in the state of nature for other goods, 
such as security and equality. 
 
In figure 2, this second stage is illustrated, where the logos have organized in a 
polis to protect against the licentiousness of others, so they might enjoy their 
liberty in peace. If they so please they might also sacrifice more of their liberty for 
increased justice, equality or some other unspecified good. These two stages 
represent the essential principles of negative liberty. 
 
An essential point is that the logos has not changed in this movement from nature 
to the polis. The logos might sacrifice liberty for “values”, but this is all, there is 
no Aristotelian transformation from beast to citizen. In a sense the negative 
conception is based on the idea that there is no differentiation between relations 
outside the polis or inside the polis, in that they all inevitably entail a loss of 
liberty. Unless of course one reduces the other party of the relation to for instance 
property, as with slaves. But in relations between the protected logos of the polis 
and in the individual's relation with the polis as a whole, one is exchanging liberty 
for other goods. Liberty is only concerned with the amount of constraint that is 
placed on the logos through relations with other logos, be that in personal or state-
individual relations. This is what leads Berlin (2006) to write:  
 
Liberty in this sense is principally concerned with the area of control, not with 
its source. [...] The despot who leaves his subjects a wide area of liberty may be 
unjust, or encourage the wildest inequalities, care little for order, or virtue, or 
knowledge; but provided he does not curb their liberty, or at least curbs it less 
than other regimes, he meets with Mill’s specifications. (pp. 373) 
 
This is an important point as it illustrates the nature of negative liberty and how it 
views relations as a zero-sum game as relates to liberty. There is no qualification 
of the good or the bad relation, one might live under a Sultan or a democratic 
government, it matters little in regards to liberty, the important matter is the extent 
of the area of interference. This is because all relations come at a cost of liberty 
for the isolated logos. This transactional nature of liberty and its conception of the 
isolated logos, are what defines negative liberty and enables an ideology that 
isolates the individual from both the polis and other logos as regards his or her 
liberty. 
 
3.3 Republican Liberty 
As republican liberty is slightly more complex and less well known than negative 
liberty I will briefly describe it before discussing how it relates to the logos as 
such. 
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Skinner (2006) writes that republican liberty as a concept harkens back to the 
Roman conception of citizenship and slavery, the Digest of Roman law states that 
“the fundamental division within the law of persons is that all men and women are 
either free or slaves” (Skinner, 2006: 402). In the Digest the definition of a slave 
is; an individual who, contrary to nature, is subject to the dominion of another. 
The definition of slavery then produces the definition of a free citizen, this is an 
individual who is “sui juris, capable of acting in their own right” (Skinner, 2006: 
403). With this definition of a free citizen as a foundation, the “democratic 
gentlemen” of England argued against the discretionary power of the monarchy. 
They argued that the discretionary powers of the monarch, led to the citizens of 
England being “sub potestate, under the power or subject to the will of someone 
else” (Skinner, 2006: 403). The discretionary powers of the monarch meant that 
they were living in dependence on the goodwill of the monarch and that they were 
therefore living as slaves not as free citizens. Skinner (2006) quotes Henry Parker 
and writes:  
 
If we accept that the king has a right to impose this levy, so that ‘to his sole 
indisputable judgement it is left to lay charges as often and as great as he 
pleases’, this will ‘leave us the most despicable slaves in the world’. The reason 
is that this will leave us in a condition of total dependence on the king’s 
goodwill. [...] if we have not alternative but to ‘presume well of our Princes’, 
then ‘wherein doe we differ in condition from the most abject of all 
bondslaves?’ (pp. 404). 
 
 
As we see this notion of liberty is not based on the absence of coercion or 
interference, but rather on the state of living under the dependence of another's 
goodwill. In Figure 4, we see that the polis exercises power over the logos and 
this can be seen as a relation (R). What Skinner says is that, the structure of this 
relation defines liberty, not the mere existence of the relation as such. Figure 4, 
represents the vertical relation that is implied in republican liberty and serves as 
the main point of argument in A Third Concept of Liberty, with the democratic 
gentlemen arguing against a despotic monarchy and for a sort of constitutional 
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monarchy. The idea being that the extent of power exercised is not the principal 
point, rather how that power is exercised. 
 
However, the thrust of the argument goes further than that, because the principle 
of republican liberty is this, that dependence on the goodwill of anyone impinges 
the individual’s liberty (Skinner, 2006). This leads to the addition of a horizontal 
layer of relations between logos, as seen in figure 5. The relations as such don’t 
constitute a constraint on liberty, it’s the nature of the relationship that defines it 
as a constraint on liberty. To summarize the republican conception of liberty, 
Skinner provides a clear differentiation from the negative conception when 
discussing the concepts relation to autonomy. Skinner (2006) writes: 
 
Those who believe that liberty is nothing other than absence of interference are 
committed to the view that the will is autonomous so long as it is neither 
threatened nor coerced. By contrast, those who embrace the neo-Roman 
argument deny that the will can be autonomous unless it is also free from 
dependence on the will of anyone else (pp.409). 
 
The question now becomes how this conception of liberty relates to the 
conception of the logos in nature. To answer this question we need turn to 
Arendt’s (2013) description of the ancient Greek perspective on barbarians, the 
household and how these entities relate to the polis. She writes that to be political, 
to live in a polis, means that all questions are regulated via speech and not 
violence, here I think we need to see violence as a metaphor for domination. This 
comes out in Arendt’s writing, because the demarcation of the political from the 
private in the Greek conception is the absence of domination, because both to 
dominate and to be dominated is seen as muting the logos, it is in the nature of 
equals to speak, both as senders and receiver, this is distinct from the dominated 
relationship because it cannot “hold” a dialogue. 
 
The household in the polis and the barbarian communities outside the polis were 
in this way seen as pre-political entities, because in these entities speech was 
disturbed by relations of domination. The paterfamilias exercised despotic power 
in his household, and the essence of barbarians were that they allowed violence to 
mute speech. These are both states of being where arbitrary power, most often in 
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the form of violence, mutes the logos. So whereas we’ve previously focused on 
the vertical domination that can occur, as pointed to by the democratic gentlemen, 
the state of nature illustrated in figure 6, can be seen as the horizontal of figure 5, 
without the control of the vertical dimension, this would be similar to the 
barbarian entities. 
 
According to the Greek perspective, an individual in this pre-political state would 
be aneu logou, which means without logos. But Arendt (Ibid) writes that we 
shouldn’t understand this as them being conceptualized as individuals without 
logos, rather that they exist outside of the space where the logos can articulate 
itself through speech, I conceptualize them as mute logos (ML), seen in figure 6. 
The understanding of liberty as the absence of arbitrary power is linked in this 
way to the understanding of the logos. If the logos exist in the horizontal without 
vertical control it will be dominated, however as shown by the arguments of the 
democratic gentlemen the polis can also come to dominate the logos vertically 
through arbitrary powers of the state.  
 
Figure 7, shows a movement by the mute logos to a state of speech in a polis, the 
nature of this relation is illustrated in figure 8. In this entity, the polis regulates the 
interpersonal relations of the logos, the simplest example is the institution of some 
sort of police to eliminate violence, as this is the most arbitrary form of 
domination. The logos then in kind regulate the polis to protect themselves from 
the arbitrary domination of, for instance, the police. This creates a situation 
wherein on might expect to see the sort of institutions that exist in western liberal-
democracies. This is the reason for the hard boundary between the polis and 
nature, and the porous one between the logos and the polis in figure 7. This is 
meant to represent the fact that in this structure the hard compromise of liberty 
and relations existing in negative liberty is not present in the same way. While 
republican liberty is a negative concept (Skinner, 2006: 409), it’s negative in a 
different way than negative liberty, in that it demands the absence of domination. 
The absence of domination might demand a non-dominating relation to secure it, 
as for instance we see in a regulated police force. This is in essence a 
diametrically opposed conception of the position of the logos in the polis as 
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compared to the one in negative liberty. If we recall Berlin’s statement that the 
important question is not, who governs me or how, but to what extent I’m 
interfered with. In the republican case, it’s very much a question of who governs 
me and how, and the question of area of interference is secondary. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To summarize, I’ve tried to represent the essence of the republican conception of 
the logos and its relation to liberty in the polis via the completely un-mathematical 
functions in figure 9. Justice is meant to represent the nature of the relationship, 
this is of course a very broad and contested concept, but I merely use it to 
conceptualize the opposite of an arbitrary relation. Area of interference is thought 
of as in negative liberty and seen to vary from 0 to 1 while Justice varies from -1 
to 1. I’ve illustrated some of the important functions, to show the porous nature of 
the relations of the logos in the polis. As we see in function 9A, this is the 
negative diminishing of liberty through area of interference. In 9B we see liberty 
be diminished even though there is no increase in the area of interference merely 
through the nature of the relationship being “unjust”. Then in function 9C we see 
how a “just” expansion of the area of interference leads to no loss of liberty, but 
an increase in the unspecified good, for instance, security.  
 
How does this relate to what am I and how I relate to the world around me? In this 
case my pre-political state is one of mute power which inhibits speech. As I enter 
a political state, my logos is protected from domination by horizontal actors by 
vertical power controlling the horizontal actors around me. But now I face the 
peril of the arbitrary power of the vertical actor, so for my logos to be free in both 
the vertical and horizontal dimension I must disabuse the state of its arbitrary 
power. In this equilibrium of “justice” I’m a citizen in a structure defined by non-
arbitrary rules that ensure the protection from arbitrary power. Again it’s 
important to emphasize the porous nature of the logos as a citizen in relation to 
the “logos in polis” within the negative conception. Whereas the logos in the 
negative conception is isolated by liberty from both other logos and the group as 
institutionalized by the polis. The logos of a citizen is isolated by the republican 
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conception of liberty from arbitrary domination but not from relations with the 
group and other logos as such. 
 
3.4 Positive Liberty 
In my discussion of positive liberty and its relation to the logos I will be working 
from the position that positive liberty is best understood in its relation to negative 
liberty. This because I see positive liberty as an empirically fluctuating position, a 
quality that’s inherent in its empirical nature whereas negative liberty is constant 
in its separation from the empirical, we might therefore understand the relation to 
the logos illustrated in negative liberty as a deviation from a norm of positive 
liberty. I will try and illustrate this using Kant’s (2012) conceptualization of 
understanding and sense in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. 
 
Positive liberty is fundamentally different from the negative theories of liberty (I 
will be referring to both negative and republican liberty as negative liberty as they 
are both negative theories of liberty) in that it questions an article of faith 
concerning the nature of the logos. In conceptualizing negative types of liberty we 
viewed the logos as an object moving through space and time, we then defined its 
liberty in its relation to certain externalities. For republican liberty it was arbitrary 
power and negative liberty it was interference by others. Negative and republican 
liberty presupposes an idea of the logos as an object who accepts it’s will without 
questioning the will as an autonomous generator of action. Negative liberty is in 
this sense merely concerned with the space that the agent moves through. 
 
This perspective can be related to Kant’s (2012) proposition that man is separated 
into two entities, an intelligence that exists in the world of understanding, and an 
entity that is present in the world of sense. He writes that by the nature of 
distinguishing between the world of senses and the world of understanding we 
prove the existence of reason and mark the boundary of understanding itself. In 
this view we must understand that man can consider himself from two vantage 
points, and recognize two different laws that govern his behaviour. He writes 
“first, in so far as it belongs to the world of sense, under the law of nature 
(heteronomy), secondly, as belonging to the intelligible world, under laws that, 
independent of nature, are not empirical but have their foundation merely in 
reason. (Kant, 2012: 62)” So, as far as a man considers himself a rational being, 
hence belonging to the world of understanding, he must think of his will as being 
free from the heteronomy of the world of sense. In this way the notion of a man 
having a will that is causally undetermined, is based on the notion that it’s free 
from the heteronomous laws of nature and instead governed by the apodictic law 
of reason. This idea is in a sense based on faith in that it can’t be proven in 
relation to the natural world. But Kant writes that “By thinking himself into a 
world of understanding practical reason does not at all overstep its boundaries; but 
it would if it wanted to look or sense itself into it.” He reiterates the point by 
stating that reason only dictates that the will must act according to an apodictic 
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maxim dictated by reason. If however “it were to fetch in addition an object of the 
will i.e. a motive, from the world of understanding then it would overstep its 
bounds, and presume acquaintance with something of which it knows nothing. 
(ibid: 67)” So regardless of these laws and if we actually act according to them, 
we see that Kant conceptualizes a logos that is in the dialogue between the senses 
and reason. What is fundamentally clear is that sense or the natural world can’t be 
used to infer anything about reason and as he makes explicit in earlier chapters an 
apodictic maxim of reason is that it must treat all other reasoning beings as ends 
in themselves i.e. as independently willing agents. (Ibid: 51). 
 
This might seem a rather convoluted way of stating something rather simple and 
commonly accepted, that we all possess a transcendental element that makes us 
equal as humans, regardless of empirical circumstances. However, it does provide 
us with an analytic structure within which we can discuss the differences between 
the sacred and the profane logos which is useful for understanding negative and 
positive liberty. Furthermore it’s important to distinguish between perspectives 
that hold the logos as autonomous and that don’t, in that we must see the 
particular transcendentalism that underpins negative theory as unique and that its 
uniqueness is explained via the universality presupposed in Kantian metaphysics 
for a synthetic a priori statement. There may very well be other transcendental 
ideas about man that don’t presuppose universality and instead discriminate in 
some positive fashion. 
 
Returning to the difference between positive and negative liberty. In positive 
liberty the perspective is different from negative in that it questions the 
fundamental assumption about the logos inherent in negative theory. Charles 
Taylor’s (2006) text What’s wrong with negative liberty seems to be a critique of 
negative liberty but is really an argument for positive liberty as he makes some 
fundamental claims about the logos that contradict the negative position. Taylor 
(2006) questions the constancy of the logos when he articulates the idea that the 
logos might be acting in an unfree capacity because of internal “blockage”. He 
writes  
 
For they seem to be cases in which the obstacles to freedom are internal; and if 
this is so, then freedom can’t simply be interpreted as the absence of external 
obstacles; and the fact that I’m doing what I want, in the sense of following my 
strongest desire, isn’t sufficient to establish that I’m free. On the contrary, we 
have to make discriminations among motivations, and accept that acting out of 
some motivations, for example irrational fear or spite, or this too great need for 
comfort, is not freedom, is even a negation of freedom. (pp. 393) 
 
We see that positive liberty tries to remove the transcendental aspect and bring all 
of “man” into the empirical, and there judge if the logos is truly internally free. 
Taylor (2006) writes that just by admitting the fact that the logos might be wrong 
or negating its own liberty, he’s not proposing that anyone else should be capable 
of judging the logos, he’s merely stating the fact that the logos might be hindering 
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itself. However, when we view positive liberty from the perspective of it as an 
ideological component, we must concede that positive liberty only becomes a 
relevant idea ideologically if one proposes a rationality or normative idea of the 
logos and its motivations and goals. Positive liberty in the Kantian sense produces 
a contingent idea of the logos from the world of sense. Whereas negative liberty is 
based on the transcendental proposition of universality and works from the 
synthetic a priori statement of “The autonomy of the will as the supreme principle 
of morality. (Kant, 2012: 51)”. 
 
One might think, in viewing the ideological implications of negative and positive 
liberty that negative theory produces incarnations defined by flexibility or 
relativity while positive liberty produces rigidity. Because negative liberty 
proposes a limit set of rules, whereas positive generally proposes a much broader 
set of rules. However, I think this is a misunderstanding, and the illumination of 
this misunderstanding was of course the great contribution of Kant's Copernican 
revolution of philosophy. He showed that the empirical world is a world of sense, 
that objects are possible not through themselves but through conception. By first 
admitting this constructivist proposition, he created a space outside or divorced 
from sense where a priori reasoning could be embarked upon. In this sense by 
discarding what was previously considered firm ground that had been irrevocably 
shaken by David Hume’s critique of causality, he found a kernel of stability in 
reason (De Pierris, 2013). Kant wrote: 
 
Experience never gives its judgement true or strict, but merely assumed or 
comparative universality (through induction) so that properly speaking, it must 
be formulated: so far as we have observed until now, no exception has been 
found to this or that rule. If therefore, a judgement I thought with strict 
universality, i.e., so that no exception at all is allowed to be possible, then it is 
not derived from experience, but is valid absolutely a priori. Empirical 
universality is thus only an arbitrary augmentation of validity from that which is 
valid in most cases to that which is valid in all--as, e.g., in the proposition: all 
bodies are heavy. By contrast, where strict universality essentially belongs to a 
judgement, this [universality] indicates a special source of cognition for [the 
judgement], namely a faculty of a priori cognition. Necessity and strict 
universality are thus secure criteria of an a priori cognition, and also inseparably 
belong together. (Ch. 2) 
 
This same logic might usefully be applied to conceptualizing negative and 
positive liberty. So that in fact positive liberty, because of its recourse to the 
empirical becomes relative, while negative liberty, with its limited but strict 
universality becomes rigid and absolute. Skinner (2006) echoes the relativity of 
positive liberty when he writes:  
 
What underlies these theories of positive liberty is that the belief that human 
nature has an essence, and that we are free if and only if we succeed in realizing 
that essence in our lives. This enables us to see that there will be as many 
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different interpretations of positive liberty as there are different views about the 
moral character of mankind. (pp. 400) 
 
Correspondingly we must try and consider if we might be able to see some 
general aspects of interest when considering positive liberty as an ideological 
component. 
 
One is inclined to interrogate the meeting of the positive vision with the world, in 
that it might be conceptualized as one moving and internally dynamic object 
trying to match the movement of another moving, dynamic, object. In the 
inevitable mismatches we might look for violence or repression. Or we might look 
to the positive visions themselves, for instance the current debate within the 
Catholic Church (Brown, 2017) if the church should strive to match the world or 
if the world should match the church. We might say that a positive ideology 
becomes apolitical if it resorts to the mute force of violence to enforce its vision 
and perhaps we might say that the “political” positive vision uses “soft” power 
rather than hard. But I think in these cases we are not respecting the internal 
coherence of the positive argument.  
 
Take the example of the debate within the Catholic Church. If Pope Francis is 
arguing for acceptance of non-Catholics or heretics based on a universal or 
Kantian conception of the logos he is moving outside or to a position 
fundamentally different from the positive one. In the sense that he is arguing for 
the acceptance of non-Catholics and heretics on the base of interpretation of 
catholic dogma these claims are merely contingent on an empirical observation. 
Positive liberty is defined by its empirical nature which divests it from the 
absolute laws of reason and leaves it in the relativity of the world of sense. In this 
analysis the defining characteristic of positive liberty becomes its contingent 
conception of the logos as opposed to the negative universal conception of the 
logos. Furthermore this is based solely on the metaphysical underpinning of the 
two conceptions of liberty not on any particular expression of these ideas. This 
separation is what Taylor (2006) tries to overcome in What’s wrong with negative 
liberty. He writes, “The idea of holding the Maginot Line before this Hobbesian 
concept is misguided not only because it involves abandoning some of the most 
inspiring terrain of liberalism, which is concerned with individual self-realisation, 
but also because the line turns out to be untenable. The first step from the 
Hobbesian definition to a positive notion, to a view of freedom as the ability to 
fulfil my purposes and as being greater the more significant the purposes, is one 
we cannot help taking. (Taylor, 2006: 397)” However I think he is wrong, the 
Maginot line stands, and Kant offers us a useful conceptual structure to 
understand it. 
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3.5 History and Change 
I propose two different conceptions of change as summarized by Koselleck (2004) 
in his book Futures past - on the semantics of historical time, prognostic and 
prophetic. The prophetic perspective is separated into two distinct parts, the 
eschatological and the secular. Koselleck (2004: 42-48) writes that the 
eschatological prophecy was central in Europe up until the 17th century when it 
was challenged by the prognostications of politicians in the then freshly minted 
European nation-states. However, both the religious prophecy and the prognosis 
had a similar static character to it, in that the religious end-time had stabilized 
history through the tradition of the church. Similarly the prognosis stabilized 
history in that it reproduced the past into the future. The prognosis shapes the 
future, but it’s based on the past, it thereby projects the past into the future as a 
political act. This created a cyclical perspective on history based on what was seen 
as natural constants, the longest cycle was seen as the life of the monarch, as this 
was the essential natural constant. In this way, the state that operates on a 
prognosticating basis becomes tied into what Koselleck (2004) calls a static-
dynamic time structure, the future varies within the static structures that are 
reproduced by the prognosis. So in the particular example of the 17-18th century 
monarchies of Europe, things happened, but they happened within the spatio-
temporal political and social structure. This was all challenged by the secular 
prophetic perspective. Koselleck writes that his grew out of the conflict between 
states that were based on the old religious idea of salvation, but operated on a 
prognostic basis which in a sense froze time. From this arose a prophetic 
perspective within 18th century citizen who, thinking beyond both monarchy and 
church became “le prophete philosoph”, the philosophical prophet. What was 
unique of this secular prophet, was that he called for the betterment of man 
through radical progress, radical in the sense that it made long term prognosis 
based on prophecy and not the past. This opens up a future that transcends the 
natural constants and the previously predictable static-dynamic structure 
(Koselleck, 2004: 48) and is in a sense fully dynamic in relation to the relativity of 
prophecy. 
 
I've tried to illustrate the difference in figure 10 and 11, in figure 10 you see the 
static-dynamic pattern that is produced by projecting natural constants into the 
future through political prognostication. In figure 11 we see how the prophecy 
breaks entirely with the social and political structure of the past, breaking with the 
natural constants, and establishes a new timeline based on the prophecy. I think 
it’s vital to see that these lines of history are not merely ephemeral visions of the 
future. The static-dynamic time horizon that one projects out from the present has 
very real political and social consequences for the individual in that this 
fundamentally relates to the individual's evaluation of how his or her position will 
change in the political and social structure. In a sense I’m trying to say something 
rather simple and obvious in a convoluted way, individuals are liable to respond to 
what they perceive as negative change to their future prospects. This is a universal 
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response that might vary according to individual sensitivity to threats or other 
psychological dimensions, however the point is that we can’t attribute a 
conservative position to any particular ideology. A resistance to change that 
manifests itself in political action is in a sense pre-political and is liable to appear 
anywhere organised interests are threatened. I include change into the model 
because this allows us to systematically map the seeming similarities that can 
occur when a prophecy converges or for a time runs along a static-dynamic “line”. 
Furthermore any divergence from the current static-dynamic structure will be 
liable to produce a counter, and this counter is liable to be co-opted by other 
prophetic visions. The point being not so much to critique whatever practical 
variations that might occur but instead to produce a systematic description of the 
ideological space as it’s constituted by prophetic visions and conservative urges. 
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4 Test, Results and Conclusions 
I produced a sample of statements that were to represent the various relevant 
aspects of liberty and change that I discuss in this paper. This resulted in thirteen 
statements, concerning fundamental aspects, nine questions to test: liberty as such, 
political liberty and the law in relation to liberty and four questions for the two 
perspectives on change. The statements were administered using HTMLQ, a 
program for producing online q-tests. This online test was then distributed through 
social media, I asked a left leaning student group and a right leaning student group 
to share the test with some of their members. Furthermore I asked respondents to 
list what party they would vote for if there was an election today. 
 
The statements that I used where: (These are translated from the Swedish 
statements used in the study). 
 
1. Liberty is to act unhindered 
2. Liberty is to act rationally 
3. Liberty is to not be controlled by arbitrary power 
4. Political liberty is to act unhindered by the state 
5. Political liberty is to act in line with your interests 
6. Political liberty is to act as equals 
7. Laws limit individual liberty 
8. Laws can force individual liberty 
9. Laws create liberty 
10. The most important thing when we make decisions is our understanding of 
the past 
11. Stability is more important than change 
12. The most important thing when we make decisions is our aim 
13. Stability is usually an excuse to avoid change 
 
The parties I listed where: 
 
M (Moderaterna) 
L (Liberalerna) 
C (Centerpartiet) 
KD (Kristdemokraterna) 
SAP (Socialdemokratisk arbetarpartiet) 
V (Vänsterpartiet) 
MP (Miljöpartiet) 
FI (Feministiskt initiativ) 
SD (Sverigedemokraterna) 
U (Undefined) 
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From this I received 36 answers (q-sorts), I factor analysed them to identify 
relations among the q-sorts, or if you will relations among particular patterns of 
answers. This is an important point in using q-method, that one is interested in the 
relationship between “packages” of answers as a whole and not among particular 
answers although particular answers become relevant for defining various answer 
“packages”. Because I had the participants order various statements from -2 to +2, 
these previously disparate statements are all coded along a coherent axis of values 
and can be exposed to factor analysis.  
 
The first step in analysing the data was to perform a centroid factor analysis. What 
the factor analysis does is take our 36 different sorts, stack them in a matrix and 
then identify the line or vector that runs through the “grand average of the 
relationships between all the sorts as they are represented by their correlation 
coefficients” (Strickling & Almedia, 2004). What we do in the analysis is to 
instruct the data to identify more than one vector to discern a multiplicity of 
averages within the data. 
 
After this the data is rotated, this is done to further increase the explanatory power 
of the factors. One might imagine a two-dimensional coordinate system, with 36 
various points scattered across it, what the rotation does is to shift the axes (the 
factors) to alter the variance in some way. I used a varimax rotation, which aims 
to maximize the variance between factors. If for instance one has a cluster of q-
sorts positioned between the x and the y axis one might rotate the axis so that this 
cluster aligns with the x axis. There is no manipulation of the data, one merely 
increases the clarity of the factors.  
 
With the factor analysed and rotated data, I flagged relevant q-sorts to be used in a 
final analysis, these are marked with an X in figure 13. The Q-sorts were flagged 
if they were highly significant to the factor at an error level of p < 0.05 (Zabala 
2014: 165-166). These flagged q-sorts are the subjects that particularly define a 
certain vector, these were then analysed to produce an archetypal picture of each 
particular factor and this picture is presented via distinguishing statements. The 
statements show the average variance on highly significant statements for each 
factor, the variance varies from -2 to 2, with 0 meaning that the factor is neutral to 
that statement.  
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4.1 Results 
The results are based on the 23 out of 36 (63%) q-sorts that were mapped onto the 
three significant factors that were identified through the centroid factor analysis, 
these are shown in figure 12. In figure 12 we see both the party affiliation to the 
left and to what extent the q-sort corresponds to the archetypal q-sort produced by 
the average of that factor, this varies from -1 to 1.  
 
When analysing the distinguishing statements it’s important to keep in mind that 
each factor in and of itself does not present the whole picture. All factors positions 
on all statements are present, they are merely separated out according to 
significance and to provide a clearer picture of the essential statements for each 
factor. Of course in analysing the data we must take into account the loadings for 
each statement.  
 
 
4.1.1 Factor Loadings 
4.1.2 Distinguishing statements for Factor 1 
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(P < .05; Asterisk (*) Indicates Significance at P < .01) 
                                                                                          
  No.          Statement                                                                         Factors  
                                                                                                1             2            3 
   7. Laws limit individual liberty                                         1.29*       0.36      0.10  
   2. Liberty is to act rationally                                             0.16*      -1.88     -1.41  
   8. Laws can force individual liberty                                 -1.41         0.73      -0.87  
   9. Laws create liberty                                                       -1.42*       1.10     -0.21 
 
4.1.3 Distinguishing statements for Factor 2 
 
(P < .05; Asterisk (*) Indicates Significance at P < .01) 
                                                                                       
  No.           Statement                                                                                  
                                                                                                          Factors   
                                                                                               1             2             3 
   9 Laws create liberty                                                       -1.42       1.10*     -0.21  
   8 Laws can force the individual to liberty                       -1.41       0.73*     -0.87  
   6 Political liberty is to act as equals                                -1.13       0.64*     -0.64  
   5 Political liberty is to act in line with your interests       0.31      -0.73*      0.04  
  11 Stability is more important than change                       0.53      -0.85*      0.99  
   4 Political liberty is to act unhindered by the state           0.89      -1.05*      0.82 
 
4.1.4 Distinguishing statements for Factor 3 
         (P < .05; Asterisk (*) Indicates Significance at P < .01) 
 
           No.           Statement                                               
                                                                                                   Factors 
                                                                                           1            2            3 
   1. Liberty is to act unhindered                                          0.30       -0.16       1.43* 
  10 The most important thing when we make decisions... -0.12      -0.24       1.25* 
   9 Laws create liberty                                                        -1.42       1.10      -0.21* 
   8 Laws can force the individual to liberty                        -1.41       0.73      -0.87  
  12 The most important thing when we make decisions… 0.84       1.16      -1.46* 
 
4.1.5 Consensus statements 
All Listed Statements are Non-Significant at P>.01 
                                                               
  No.     Statement                                                    
                                                                                                       Factors 
                                                                                                 1         2          3 
   3 Liberty is to not be controlled by arbitrary power          1.12     1.45     0.81 
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4.2 Conclusions 
I’m greatly constrained in what conclusions I can draw from this data as I made 
the fatal mistake of thinking I could construct a concourse from literature, in 
doing this I failed to foresee the fact that statements that are coded one way by 
philosophy are coded another in current Swedish political discourse. Because of 
this it would require at least an exposition of the current Swedish political climate 
to adequately analyse the data, something that I feel is not in the remit of this 
paper. What I might say is that statements two and five which were intended to 
capture a positive conception of liberty map horrendously, I hypothesise this is 
because of their connection to economic rationalization and self-interested voting, 
as in voting with your wallet. Statement eight, which was to represent the 
willingness to coerce that we might see as a positive conception meets a dynamic 
reality, was just plain bad. It is of course an aspect of both positive and republican 
liberty that one can be coerced into greater liberty. So for the purpose of mapping 
positive liberty I would say all three statements failed completely. In a sense this 
disturbs the entire mapping, as individuals are responding to information outside 
the theoretical model and thereby shifting the maps of their answers that they 
were to create. Furthermore because I didn’t interview my subjects, I have no data 
on how they understood the statement, so when the data throws up any answers 
that are in the slightest unexpected I am left resorting to conjecture, see above. 
 
To summarise I failed both on the front-end and the back-end in relation to 
properly examining the subjects. I failed to produce statements that coherently 
mapped to the way the subjects conceptualised liberty, and I failed to ask them 
how they thought about the statements when they ranked them so as to have some 
explanatory foundation for unexpected patterns.  
 
Notwithstanding these failures, we might see if there are any patterns in the data 
that we might point out with some sense of plausibility. The first pattern I would 
like to bring to your attention is the indication of patterning based on perceptions 
of change. Both factor one and two map positively towards statement 12, while 
factor three is highly negative. Similarly factor one and two are slightly negative 
to statement 10, while this is a defining statement for factor three.  
 
                                                                                             1         2          3 
         12 The most important thing […] is our aim                    0.84     1.16    -1.46 
 
 
                                                                                                        1           2            3 
         10 The most important thing […] the past                       -0.12      -0.24       1.25 
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Now theree are some kinks in this description, statement 13 was the only 
statement that failed to map significantly and statement 11 contradicts this pattern 
somewhat, with factor 1 also being positive to the notion that stability is more 
important than change. Here is an example of where interviews would have been 
useful.  
 
                                                                                                         1           2           3 
         11 Stability is more important than change                         0.53     -0.85      0.99 
 
Moving on, it would seem that our factors generally map towards the negative and 
republican conceptions of liberty, not very surprising considering that positive 
liberty is out of the game. Everyone seems to agree with statement three, it being 
the only significant consensus statement. However there is some disagreement as 
to whether the logos is porous or isolated.  
                      1          2           3    
3 Liberty is to not be controlled by arbitrary power            1.12     1.45     0.81 
  
If we look at statement nine and six, we see a pattern emerging where factor two 
represents a republican conception of liberty while factors one and three are 
opposed to this notion. If we include factor eight, which might accidentally be 
contributing, this pattern becomes stronger. If you then look at statement four, a 
statement that clearly goes against the notion of the vertical relation protecting the 
logos from domination in the horizontal sphere. I think you can plausibly state 
that factor two represents a republican conception while factors one and three do 
not. 
  
                                                                                          1          2             3 
9 Laws create liberty                                                          -1.42      1.10       -0.21 
 
                                                                                          1           2            3    
6 Political liberty is to act as equals                                   -1.13      0.64       -0.64 
 
                                                                                                1           2             3 
8 Laws can force individual liberty                                    -1.41      0.73       -0.87 
 
                                                                                          1           2            3 
4 Political liberty is to act unhindered by the state              0.89      -1.05       0.82 
 
So we know what factor two is, its prophetic republican liberty. The problem 
arises when you try and understand factor one and three, we know that they're not 
republican liberty, we know that factor one is inclined towards a prophetic vision 
while factor three is highly conservative. We might say that they're both negative 
liberty factors and that the differences in change are throwing up some anomalies 
that might have been explained by interviews or that factor three is focusing on its 
conservative position which leaves less room for a clear position on liberty. 
Regardless, statements one and seven mess things up, and the difference in 
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emphasis on statement nine also seems perturbing. I do however think we can say 
that factor one and three represent different negative conceptions of liberty. 
 
                                                                                        1            2            3 
1 Liberty is to act unhindered                                            0.30      -0.16       1.43 
 
                                                                                        1            2            3 
7 Laws limit individual liberty                                          1.29       0.36       0.10 
  
                                                                                        1            2            3 
9 Laws create liberty                                                         -1.42      1.10      -0.21 
 
Before concluding I would also like to present the fact that out of 33 subjects that 
indicated what party they would vote for, 18 out of 20 (90%) right wing subjects 
trended towards factors one or two. While 9 out of 13 (69%) left wing voters 
trended towards factor 2, with two of the missing left wing voters indicating that 
they would vote for the extraparliamentary party FI, which might explain their 
variance. This high degree of stratification does seem to indicate some relation 
between factors and current ideological differences in Swedish politics. 
 
To conclude, the empirical test was not a success, neither was it a complete 
failure. I think it manages to produce some plausible patterns of both liberty and 
change that indicate to me that this line of inquiry is worth pursuing and finally 
that q-method requires a lot more legwork than I’m used to.  
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5 Concluding remarks 
Yuval Noah Harari (2017) writes that Homo sapiens ability to utilise constructed 
collective fictions of consciousness enables us to transcend our genome and our 
environment. In a sense we have come to dominate Cartesian space through 
phenomelogically true fictions. This paper should be seen as trying to 
systematically describe and perhaps attribute some functionality to certain 
patterns of collective consciousness that I’ve observed.  
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